The Convoluted Nature of the African Ivory Trade by Williams, Jonah M.
Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development 
Vol. 15, Iss. 1 (2016), Pp. 181-192  
	
The Convoluted Nature of the African Ivory Trade	
Possible Solutions for Curbing the Destructive Nature of Poaching and Promoting 
Elephant Conservation 
Jonah M. Williams 






The current nature of ivory and elephant conservation within Africa 
is extremely ambiguous and filled with much uncertainty. The 
purpose of this work is to investigate objectively the sources for this 
convoluted complexion, which stem from a wide variety of issues 
including (but not limited to) geopolitics, imperialism, 
governmental legitimacy, foreign policies, and present-day western 
influences. In addition, this work also considers certain ecological 
ramifications of the current illicit African ivory trade and sheds light 
on not only the problems relating to direct poaching, but also 
extraneous pressures, both internal and external, which are causing 
a high demand for ivory. Through such analyses, this paper 
investigates possible solutions to lower poaching and stimulates 
conservation on the African elephant, promotes community-based 
conservation, and relieves African nations of post-imperialistic 
stress, granting them increased autonomy on the matter. 	
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As a student and scholar, I am personally very interested in 
ecological and geographical issues revolving around the 
conservation of diverse flora and fauna. In our day and age, many 
scholars have labeled the twenty-first century as the beginning of 
the “Sixth Age of Extinction,” which is undeniably being caused by 
humanity’s interaction with the environment. It is imperative that as 
a society we understand that our actions are causing an extreme loss 
of biodiversity and that we come together to try and understand the 
complexity of ecosystem destruction, educate others, and help 
preserve species that are on the brink of extinction. 	
I became interested in environmental conservation at a 
young age through the numerous amounts of hours I would spend 
outside and various camping/hiking trips that my family would take. 
Upon entering college, I built upon this passion by immersing 
myself in courses such as “Conservation,” taught by Dr. Richard 
Schroeder (who specializes in geopolitics and African Studies). 
Through this class, I was introduced to the topic of elephant 
conservation, as well as the troubling issue of poaching and the 
destructive nature of the illegal demand for ivory. I hope this work 
will allow you to gain a better understanding of the “convoluted” 
nature of this issue, and why it is important for policy-makers, 
researchers, and conservationists to consider all parts of the picture 
before going forward with decision-making. Going forward, I hope 
to continue researching this very interesting issue, and at the least, 
that my piece will be able to inspire you to get involved in the 






















The illegal wildlife trade is currently one of the largest 
"black-market" industries in today’s world, falling fourth behind 
drug, gun, and human trafficking trades. An 8 billion dollar industry, 
illicit wildlife trading is currently devastating the world's 
biodiversity and ecosystems, shifting the natural balance, and 
forcing animals toward extinction. One of the most popular 
commodities within the illegal wildlife trade is ivory, which comes 
mainly from illegally poached African elephants. Years of 
unregulated poaching and culling in the 1970s into the 1980s 
decimated the African elephant populations until they were on the 
brink of extinction. A ban on the legal sale of ivory in 1989 was put 
into effect by worldwide conservation organizations, such as The 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), 
the African Wildlife Fund (AWF), and the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) to try to save the elephant populations which had dropped 
extensively in numbers. This ban was very effective overall, and 
population rebound was extremely high in Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, and Tanzania (Duffy, 2010).	
The international conservation organizations, however, 
failed to recognize the voice of the Sub-Saharan African nations 
who, for the most part, argued for legal ivory trade as a mechanism 
to generate revenue for conservation efforts which would support 
parks and their anti-poaching campaigns. This has caused a stark 
division within the global conservation community, with the 
western world arguing for total protection of elephants and the Sub-
Saharan African nations pressing for regulated small legal sales, or 
at most, the ability to sell ivory from animals that have died of 
natural causes. With the transition from an era filled with plumage 
and imperialism to the Ivory Wars, it is only ethical that the rest of 
the world now let Africa begin to make some of their own decisions 
on the matter of ivory trade, while still adhering to the precedents 
set forward by CITES and other regulatory groups. In such a system, 
community-based conservation is highly supported, and autonomy 
is granted to Sub-Saharan African nations giving them the power to 
sell stockpiles of naturally harvested ivory so that revenue can be 
generated for the conservation effort, park management, and new 
scientific and technological tools, hopefully reducing the tendency 
to poach overall.	
Although widely unknown, the African ivory trade has 
existed for centuries; since the early days of civilization, the ivory 
trade routes that ran through Africa and into the Middle East helped 
bring wealth and prosperity and built empires all across its trail. 
Labeled the "Land of Punt" by the Ancient Egyptians, the Horn of 
Africa has long remained the basin for the fruitful ivory trade that 
helped build modern trade routes that were used in the late 15th and 




16th centuries, all the way up to the 19th and 20th centuries as well 
(Duffy, 2010).  	
As time passed, the uses of ivory seldom changed. In fact, 
ivory is still mainly used in ornamental practice around the world, 
generally stemming from cultural and religious influences. In the 
Philippines, a largely catholic nation, many people believe that 
getting ivory trinkets of Saints or of Jesus Christ will help them 
obtain salvation, and the finer the material one uses, the greater his 
or her chance of achieving salvation (of course ivory being the finest 
material available) (Christy, 2012). Additionally in Asia, rapid 
economic growth has increased the amount of disposable income 
within the lower classes, allowing them to splurge on certain exotic 
items. Although rhino horn, bear bile, and shark-fin soup are choice 
favorites, ivory ornaments and carvings are also a popular item 
bought by many Buddhists living in Asia. Purchasing a statue of 
Buddha or Christ is relatively easy, and priests will further bless 
them for you and instruct you on how to discreetly ship them back 
home (Christy, 2012). As Bryan Christy from National Geographic 
explains, "Because this is about faith, and because faith requires 
suspension of disbelief, ivory traded for religious purposes doesn't 
garner the aggressive scrutiny it might if it were carved into, say, 
chess pieces. God's ivory has its own loophole." (Christy, 2012) The 
fact of the matter is ivory is purely used for ornamental purposes - 
it doesn't feed people, help them live, or affect their lives for the 
better.	
This extraneous nature has warranted ivory as a commodity 
that humanity could easily do without, and thus it could theoretically 
be removed from the wildlife trade. Despite the strong stance in 
defense of the sale of ivory for religious uses, its role in cultural or 
religious ceremonies is not pivotal at their core. As Beth Allgood, 
Campaigns Director for the International Fund for Animal Welfare, 
states, "Ivory isn't used for anything but art and ornaments...in fact 
there's no good reason why anyone needs ivory...except elephants." 
(Russo, 2014) Yet, such a statement is easier said than done; the 
power to change an entire culture’s beliefs and use of a product, 
regardless of whether or not that product is used to sustain life, is 
near impossible. Thus, there will likely always be a black market to 
support those who choose to purchase ivory for religious, 
ceremonial, and cultural reasons, regardless of the status of the 
international regulations and restrictions on ivory itself. 
The complicated past of illegal ivory trade and the ban of 
legal sales in 1989 has left a true scar on the conservation world; in 
fact, the nature of the ban is partly responsible for why the current 
degraded conservation conditions exist today. The slaughter of 
elephants during the ruthless ivory wars warranted international 
action against the previously unregulated trade. Organizations like 




WWF, AWF, and CITES gathered to discuss the nature of the 
industry, and finally, in 1989, a ban was placed on the international 
trade of ivory. Additionally, international conservation 
organizations and large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
conducted massive merchandise campaigns and used “slogan-
engineering” as advertisements to raise awareness and money for 
the butchering of the elephant (Duffy, 2010). Although this measure 
was extremely effective in reducing poaching and elevating elephant 
population numbers, the resolve failed to consider the opinions and 
beliefs of the African nations on the matter, many of which were in 
support of a legal ivory trade. The “crass” decision-making of 
groups like CITES and AWF was perceived as ignorant and 
“narrow-minded,” heightening tensions between conservationists 
and creating a very clear-cut divide in the movement – those who 
supported the western authority versus those who vouched for the 
autonomy of African nations to deal with matters themselves. More 
generally speaking, this was a battle between strict protectionism 
and sustainable use, with geopolitics mixed in between (Duffy, 
2010). 	
Although it is important to acknowledge the ban and its 
immediate benefit on elephant populations, the resolves failed to 
address issues such as uncontrolled elephant population growth, 
African governmental authority, and certain cultural aspects of the 
situation, namely, the fact that westerners came to a conclusion on a 
matter that truly does not concern them. Currently, African nations 
dealing with elephants are struggling with growing numbers within 
natural reserves, problem animals, and how to raise political 
legitimacy and increase economic revenue for conservation. Many 
African nations have approached CITES with the resolve that a 
regulated ivory trade, or at least, the permission to carefully sell the 
ivory from confiscated stock piles, problem animals, and natural 
elephant deaths, could be beneficial (Duffy, 2010). Nations such as 
Tanzania and Kenya have enormous ivory stockpiles, with 
Tanzania’s most recent pile of 101,005 kg being worth about 60 
million dollars on the international market (Mande et al., 2012). In 
the past, ivory stockpiles were typically burned to send a message 
to poachers and the international community. This was championed 
by the past president of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi in the early 1990’s, 
and is still used to a certain extent in some parts of Africa. However, 
instead of burning the ivory, which is a waste of a valuable 
commodity, certain groups of Africans are now advocating for the 
right to sell their stockpiles or have the right to a small, legalized, 
and regulated trade (Perlez, 1989).	
David Stiles, an economist and conservationist who studies 
the ivory trade, explained that a successful raw ivory trade is 
possible - it encompasses tusks from monitored stockpiles, which 




come from elephants that died naturally or were identified as 
“problem animals” as well as a closely monitored system as they 
ship to Asia (Russo, 2014).  He stated, “if 50 tons of legal ivory 
could be supplied to China annually, the poaching rates would 
crash" (Russo, 2014), Additionally, this trade could generate an 
enormous amount of revenue that could be put toward elephant 
conservation, creating more jobs at national parks, increasing 
ecotourism, and actually spurring increased concern for elephants’ 
wellbeing within these nations. If revenue is generated via these 
stockpile sales, people will most likely not take kindly to poaching, 
which would severely hurt people’s jobs, and therefore their 
livelihoods, creating a social pressure among Africans to avoid 
poaching themselves. 	
One of the most important benefits of this modified ivory 
trade is that it has the potential to ameliorate conditions on both the 
donor and recipient sides of the trade. In the case of the African 
nations, direct revenue associated with isolated sales could have the 
potential to bring in money for conservation that would be handled 
directly by the economies of the respective nations, not NGOs or 
“umbrella” organizations. Earnings will be able to go to park 
management, animal care, grounds-keeping jobs, and most 
importantly, education efforts regarding sustainable use. A 
significant effort is placed on external conservation efforts in Africa, 
which does not allow ordinary Africans to get involved and excited 
about conserving their ecosystem’s animals. As Bhaskar Nath 
(2008) posed regarding funding for conservation efforts in Africa, 
“Should it be to maintain and reinforce the status quo, or should it 
be to incorporate and create [a] more effective management 
paradigm that seek the consent of the affected local stakeholders?” 
Changing the paradigm of what many call “western conservation” 
is no easy task, yet a modified legal trade could have the potential 
to do just that, putting the conservation of the African elephant back 
in the hands and hearts of Africans who live together side-by-side. 	
Additionally, the creation of a sustainable use trade also has 
the potential to benefit the receivers of the legal ivory, mainly in 
Asia. China is one of the world’s hubs for the illegal wildlife trade, 
with ivory being a highly valued commodity among the Chinese. 
The uses of these ivory products are strongly tied to Chinese culture, 
and there exists a long valued tradition of ivory carving rooted in the 
Far East. As John Frederick Walker (2014) explains, “It’s highly 
unlikely the second biggest economy in the world will undergo a 
sudden mass conversion to the view that it should immediately ban 
all ivory trade… it places great value on the cultural significance of 
its traditional ivory carving industry.” Poaching in Africa is directly 
related to the demand of illegal trade in the east, and thus a small, 
steady flow of regulated ivory to Asia could conceivably lead to a 




drastic decline in poaching rates. This could be due to the fact that 
Chinese people who go out of their way to purchase illegal ivory 
undertake a huge opportunity cost of being involved in illicit 
activities and must also pay for costs associated with those activities. 
As stated earlier by Russo (2014), flooding the Asian markets with 
controlled legal ivory will likely encourage people to consider the 
legal option when purchasing this rare commodity. This gives China 
the opportunity to launch a massive crackdown on its illegal ivory 
trade, something that it has not really pushed in the past.  Thus, “with 
no way to sell contraband tusks to the Chinese, there’d be 
diminishing payoffs for African poachers, smugglers, and corrupt 
officials” (Walker, 2014).	
Still, there are those who oppose this notion of a “modified” 
legal ivory trade and their arguments start from different premises; 
the majority stem from animal rights while others from a strict 
protectionist standpoint. Many people believe that any sort of legal 
trade will not solve the problem of poaching and an illicit trade will 
always exist, regardless of illegality or legality of sales. Mary Rice 
(2014) argues, “Just because it is difficult to enforce something does 
not mean the solution is to legalize it…traders themselves agree that 
no amount of legal trade can satisfy the current demand for ivory.” 
This notion is undeniably true – wherever there exists a route for 
illicit activities, there will surely be an illegal trade regarding that 
commodity. Thus, in order to prevent poaching outside the system 
of legal ivory sales, increased attention to elephant protection and 
conservation efforts, local education, and novel scientific and 
technological efforts to curb illegal activities must be employed 
regardless. 	
This idea of strict protectionism, however, does not consider 
the multitude of geopolitical issues that riddle African nations 
struggling with elephant conservation. Strict protectionism is 
sometimes labeled as “western conservation” due to the fact that 
decisions regarding the fate of the elephant are entirely decided upon 
by western entities and NGOs. This “classical approach” to 
conservation, championed by groups such as CITES, “traditionally 
emphasizes the formation of ‘off-limits’ protected areas, 
nationalization of ownership of wildlife, and institution of bans on 
the hunting or utilization of the protected species” (Carpenter, 
2011). There exists a certain degree of exclusion in the enactment of 
these policies, which can and has either explicitly or implicitly 
removed not only African governments, but also local communities 
from the conservation effort. The cooperative-use solution offers an 
alternative that is rooted in the principles of protectionism as well—
the goal of such a modified ivory trade is not to dismiss the ideas 
and demands of protectionism, but rather to merge them with the 
ideas of sustainable, cooperative use as well. 	




From a geopolitical perspective, the Sub-Saharan African 
region has been riddled with political corruption for many years, 
with politicians taking bribes from poachers and gangs and 
personally involving themselves in the illegal trade. Political 
instability and a certain degree of stagnancy in areas of Africa have 
shaped the world’s skepticism about a legal ivory trade, especially 
in Tanzania (Duffy, 2010; Burnett, 2012b). Additionally, many 
believe that the creation of a legalized or modified trade will result 
in a greater rate of poaching as people turn to the black market for 
even lower prices, or may coerce those who may not have thought 
about buying before into purchasing. Allgood explained that when 
it comes to the black market and corruption, “[illegal] trafficking 
cannot be stopped in a corrupt world, and buying cannot be stopped 
in a corrupt world” (Russo, 2014). Poaching, as is, is a ruthless and 
destructive industry, as illustrated by John Burnett in his piece, “In 
a Tanzanian Village, Elephant Poachers Thrive.” In an interview 
between Burnett and a local poacher, the poacher explained, 
“Sometimes when [elephants] have a funeral, it’s like a party for 
me…I kill another one, and kill another…the game reserve is my 
shop…let me go to the shop and kill.” (Burnett, 2012b) The 
extremely methodological killing that accompanies poaching, 
through the use of advanced weaponry, organized crime, and 
bribery, is something that plagues the world, but becomes even more 
detrimental when mixed with the current state of the geopolitical 
nature of governments along the Horn of Africa.	
NGO involvement in the conservation of the African 
elephant has also been widely disputed as to whether or not the 
current “status quo” is both the correct and most effective way of 
promoting the sustenance of these animals. CITES and other large 
umbrella groups predominantly use “strict legislation and the 
designation of protected areas for conservation” (Carpenter, 2011). 
This method, however, is rather inefficient in developing nations, 
such as certain Sub-Saharan African countries, as they often lack the 
resources and capabilities to adhere to these strict guidelines. They 
also may not be able to devote the necessary funds to promoting park 
protection and the very nature of this legislative approach is that it, 
according to Stefan Carpenter (2011), “remove(s) the ability of local 
communities to benefit from the utilization of species…which can 
actually have the perverse effect of incentivizing local communities 
to over-exploit protected species.” If conservation were instead 
focused on a community- and nation-based paradigm, it would 
provide groups with a sense of ownership over elephants, and in turn 
a responsibility to conserve the species as well. This community-
based conservation approach has already proved to be very effective 
in post-colonial Namibia, and it has potential to revolutionize efforts 
elsewhere in Africa. Through a modified ivory trade, African 




nations will be able to better equip and educate their communities to 
conserve at the local level through revenue generated by selling 
small stockpiles of ivory from natural deaths or problem animals, 
promoting self-sufficient sustainability and enabling the proper 
development of modern-day Africa. 	
The current political conditions within these nations are 
strengthening as more legitimate and focused governments take 
charge of their nations and recognize the problems they face. 
Specifically, within Tanzania, the new Minister of the Wildlife 
Department, Khamis Kagasheki, has a strict agenda concerning the 
regulation of parks (such as Selous National Park, which houses 
over 80,000 elephants – 25% of all of Africa’s elephants), fighting 
corruption, and collaborating with border nations to ensure that the 
latest technologies and measures are utilized against poachers 
(Burnett, 2012a). In an excerpt from an interview between John 
Burnett and Kagasheki on the nature of poaching, he replied, “What 
I'm saying is we have to be stringent. We have absolutely no choice. 
These people are killing innocent animals with impunity. And when 
you look at these elephants, beautiful beasts. Harmless.” (Burnett, 
2012a) 	
Even in an ideal system, poaching will still exist, and thus 
the utilization of new technological and scientific methods for 
tracing poachers, in combination with harsher punishment for 
poaching, could effectively result in a drop of poaching rates should 
a modified legal ivory trade be opened. Techniques such as DNA 
sequencing, gene mapping, and fluorescent proteins to make ivory 
glow under airport screening devices could allow prosecutors to 
efficiently track and locate poaching operations and individuals 
(Wasser et al., 2008). Mary Rice (2014), an advocate of strict 
protectionism in elephant conservation, stated, “How [would] 
enforcement authorities distinguish between legal and illegal 
ivory?” Bioinformatics databases, fluorescent labeling, and new 
biotechnological assays could easily be employed to label both 
illegal and legal ivory stocks so that authorities may easily 
distinguish between the two. Utilizing these methods on legally sold 
ivory could also allow the tracking and monitoring of where the 
legal ivory goes and could potentially lead investigators to stolen 
stockpiles. Additionally, advancements in unmanned drone 
technology could allow African parks to readily track and survey 
vast tracks of land to combat poachers and monitor elephant herds. 
With a close-eye from CITES and other international groups 
monitoring Sub-Saharan African governmental actions, this hybrid, 
legalized trade system could prove to be very effective.  	
The possibility of an ethical sustainable-use ivory trade is 
very plausible if all parties in the trade work together well and back 
a zero-tolerance policy for violation of any agreements. The overall 




policy which maps these changes stems from Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), a theory applied to a 
novel conservation approach which aims to empower local African 
communities and governments to get more involved in and excited 
about sustaining their elephants (Carpenter, 2011). At its base, this 
modified legal ivory trade incorporates principles of both strict 
protectionism and sustainable use, enabling this hybrid model to be 
highly desirable. A general layout of the necessary steps to 
implement such a modified trade is as follows. Firstly, the CITES 
regulated sales regarding problem animals and natural deaths should 
be made out in the “open,” and the group will serve as a mediator in 
discussions between African nations and Asia. Secondly, the 
implementation of harsher punishments for poachers, smugglers, 
and sellers of illegal ivory both in Africa and Asia is necessary to 
provide a strong foundation for a “zero” tolerance toward these 
crimes. Additionally, sales made from legal ivory stockpiles will go 
directly to funding CBNRM as well as elephant conservatories 
across Africa, giving them access to novel scientific technologies, 
such as drones, tusk protein labeling, and genetic classification of 
elephants. Finally, reports should frequently be filed from both 
Africa and Asia regarding progress, poaching prevention, and the 
relative successes and failures of various methods for future 
optimization of the program.	
 If strictly adhered to, these principles can lay the solid 
foundation for such a trade, which could extremely benefit the Sub-
Saharan African nations socially, politically, and economically. It 
could also drastically reduce poaching and the motivation to poach, 
thereby liberating Southern Africa from some of its post-
imperialistic oppression, returning conservation to the hands of the 
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